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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD-SENATE

lion were provided in the r egular bill for
1961.
REGULAR AcrfVITI!S OF THE DEPARTMENT

For the regular activities of the Department, the committee recommends
an appropriation of $1 ,397,822,500, an increase of $39.6 million over 1961. This
is $12 million under the estimates, and
$18 .9 million over the amounts carried
in the bill as it came to us from the other
body.
RESEARC H

AND COOPERATIVE EXTEN S ION
PROCR..-. M S

The committee r ecommends some
modest changes in the appropriations
for research, for the Federal research
and the "Payments to States" item.
The bill provides $78 million for the
Agricultural R esearch Service, an increase of $6,782,500 over the 1961 appropriations.
I may say that this is one item whi
is over the budget estimate and th
amount recommended by the other body.
The bill provides for the first time $1
million for a contingency research fund,
to meet unforeseen and urgent research
needs.
The committee also r ecommended a
number of increases totaling one and a
half million dollars for what it considers
urgent needs on current research.
PAYMENTS TO STATE EXP ERIMENT STATION'S

For the research payments to the State
experiment stations, an increase of $4
million over 1961 is proposed. This
makes the total $36.5 million. One million dollars of this is directed toward Investigations of research on the elimination of weeds. This has become a very
serious problem.
For payments to States for cooperative
extension work, $59,790,000 is provided.
This is an increase of $3.2 million of new
funds for distribution to the various
States under the formula.
SOIL AND WATER CONo6ERVATION PROGRAMS

For the agricultural conservation program, the committee recommends an
advance authorization for the 1962 program of $250 million, this being the
amount that has been authorized for this
program for many years.
For soil and water conservation programs administered by the Soil Conservation Service, the committee recommends $176 million, an increase of $20.8
million over 1961. This increase is principally for installing works of improvements in the watershed programs.
S CH OOL LUNCH PROGRAM

The committee recommends an appropriation for the school lunch program
of $125 million, an increase of $15 million over 1961. I am sure all the Members of the Senate are aware that a
much larger amount than that is furnished for the program through the allocation of surplus commodities and the
expenditure of section 32 funds .

For rural electnf:cation loans, the
committee recommends the full budget
estimate of $195 million, plus a contingency authorization of $50 million, making a total $245 million of new loan authorizations available for 1962.
For the rural telephone authorizations, a total of $162,500 ,000 is recommended, of which $12,500,000 is for contingency reserve authorization.
I believe that brief statement covers
the larger items in the blll.
Mr. YOUNG of North Dakota. Mr.
President, as the ranking Republican
member of the Subcommittee on Agriculture Appropriations, I commend the
senior Senator from Georgia for the excellent work he has done in handling
this complicated and exceedingly important bill now before the Senate. Only
modest increases have been made over
the House figures. These are mainly increases in authorizations for the REA,
RTA, and the Farmers Home Administration, all of which were well justified
·n the hearings.
The bill as a whole r epresents a very
nd approach to the fiscal problems
of
riculture, and the amount that is
bein asked for is needed.
I s port the bill as reported by the
Comm ee on Appropriations.
Mr.
IRKSEN. Mr. President, I
should
e to ask the distinguished
chairman
the subcommittee about a
matter on
ich I addressed a letter to
him, which
pears at page 1090 of the
hearings.
I ask unani
of the letter b
at this point.
There being n
was ordered to be
as follows :

June f20

about setting a precedent
that could have no end if tha:t were
done. I understand that the committee
actually did approve the item, and then
decided to take it out because of the
State ownership of the land. I should
like to have a little amplification as to
what the committee would do If the
State or University did surrender sufficient land to the Federal Government
for this purpose.
Mr. RUSSELL. The committee was
very anxious to provide for this item
We realize that the distinguished Senator from Illinois does not request a great
deal from the Committee on Appropriations. We are familiar with his long
r ecord of dealing with the agricultural
appropriations bill when he was a Member of the other body. He handled it
for years. I do not know whether I
should say it was at that time my "privilege" or "misfortune" to meet him in
conference on many occasions, because
in those days he was a very hard man
to convince about the appropriation of
money.
The committee considered this item.
We approved it provided the funds were
to be expended on Federal laRds. The
clerk of the committee investigated and
ascertained that the Federal Government owned no lands at this installation.
It is, I understand, a worthwhile State
station, but we did not feel we could
appropriate funds for the building of
greenhouses on State land without yielding in the future to the numerous sim'lar requests which the committee freucntly receives. So we were compelled,
regretfully, to deny the Senator's reuest.
There are instances, I understand,
hen title is conveyed to the Federal
Government to lands on State stations.
Hon. RICHARD B. RusSEL
But in this instance we were powerless
Ch airman, Subcommitte
to assist the Senator on this item.
Committee pn Approp
ate, Washington, D .C .
Mr. DIRKSEN. The Senator may or
DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: The
ay not be able to answer, but in the
frul t-breeding sta tlon at Sou
vent sufficient land were conveyed to
University at Carbondale, Ill.,
he Federal Government for this purnectlon with the work they hav
ose, what. in the Senator's judgment,
lng, there Is belle! that they caul
ould be the action of the committee?
greenhouses to good advantage.
It I estimated that the cost o
Mr. RUSSELL. It is always difficult
greenh
would be approximately,
undertake to predict what action any
repeat app
tely, $70,000 and an a
mmittee of the Senate will take; but
way to jo in th
nhouses In the sum
this were a cooperative project--and
$30,000.
nderstand that State experimental
Representative Ro BE
M ·k is carried on there with both State
of the House Subcommltte
Federal funds--I know of no reason
Appropriations, h as also made
ments In support of this project whe
the committee should not approve
lngs were held.
very modest request, if the greenOne of the reasons for the $30,000 request houses were to be constructed on lands
!or alleyways Is that due to the nature or owned by the Federal Government.
the project It Is necessary to Isolate the
Mr. DIRKSEN. I thank the distingreenhouses.
Any consideration the subcommittee can guished Senator from Georg ia.
give to this need will be appreciated.
Sincerely,
EVERETT MCKINLEY DIRKSEN,
U.S. Senate Minority Leader .

Mr. DIRKSEN. I may interpolate at
this point by saying that the matter
The committee recommends loan au- relates to the building of greenhouses
thorizations totaling $318 million for the for a fruit-breeding station proposed at
lending programs administered by the the University of Southern TI!inois. The
Farmers Home Administration. These whole amount involved would have been
authorizations are $51 million over 1961 $100,000, but it is my understanding
and are $33 million over the amounts that these greenhouses would have to
provided in the bill as it came from the be built on State, ra.ther than Federal
other body.
property, and that the committee is apLOAN AUTHORIZATIONS

prehe~e

fr

BERLIN-A STRATEGIC AREA
Mr. President, the
city of Berlin today occupies in world
affairs one of the great strategic areas of
the world .
I intend to discuss this issue from a
bipartisan point of view. As the senior
Republican in the U.S . Senate, it is my
judgment that the paramount question
to which the Berlin issue relates in many
aspects Is t.hat of ,,,. nnt ; ·
vival-allu ~he :.ul vna1 of Lh1s NatiOn
Mr. BRIDGES.

1961
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transcends all consideration of partisanship.
The safety and protection of the
American people transcend all considerations of political parties. The
least we can do for the American people
is to give them all the facts and let them
know where they stand in this hour of
continued crisis.
VVe have had a desperate need for a
foreign policy which Americans can
understand; and which our allies understand; and-most of all-which our
enemies can understand.
In our approach to some problems of
our foreign relations we have seemed at
times to blow hot, and then to blow
cold. During those times in the past
we did not assume a clear, concise position which the world could understand.
VVe have had a clear position on Berlin
in the past, but now, because of a suggested new proposal, we need to emphasize the firmness and clarity of our position.
Last VVednesday, the distinguished
senior Senator from Montana [Mr.
MANSFIELD], delivered in the Senate an
important address, during the course of
which he advanced one solution to the
problem. VVhile he made clear that he
was speaking for himself, he still is
known as his party's spokesman in the
Senate. His proposal was that Berlin,
East and VVest, might be reunited as a
free city, to be held in trust by an international authority.
Under his plan, the free city would be
guaranteed jointly by the VVestern
Powers united in NATO and Eastern
Powers united in the vvarsaw Pact. Entrance to the city from the VVest would
be controlled by what he termed "international peace teams."
The highly respected majority leader,
as we all know, made the proposal in all
good conscience. I also know he will
welcome the opinions of others.
Mr. President, I am strongly opposed
to the proposition that has been suggested.
The proposal, in some respects, resembles the short-lived Trieste agreement. It might work if Mr. Khrushchev
wanted it to, but it seems quite obvious
that if he actually desired any settlement on Berlin he would not have been
using it to make trouble for so long
a time.
The importance of the proposal suggested by the distinguished majority
leader has raised questions in newspapers, on TV and radio, and among
people generally as to the extent to
which someone else might try to use it
as a trial balloon for the President and
his Department of State. The Senator
was speaking on his own, but I know
he recognizes what importance is attached to his suggestion.
The Trieste agreement, for example,
was signed February 10, 1947, 'and held
as a free territory under United Nations
supervision. By October 5, 1954, it was
divided between Yugoslavia and Italy,
and the free territory is no more. Yugoslavia got what it wanted of the free
territory.
Under four Presidents-Roosevelt,
Truman, Eisenhower, and Kennedy-the
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United States, as well as other VVestern Berlin and their right to choose their own
Powers, has been committed to defend future.
the independence of the western part of
The President, in those words, upholds
Berlin and to maintain contact with it. the same principles on Berlin that were
Of course, this formula could, I sup- maintained by the three previous Presipose, be interpreted in varying degrees dents.
by the wo~id's diplomats. But the posiIf the suggestion of the distinguished
tion of the United States has been ab- majority leader ever came to pass, it
solutely firm; we spent millions of dol- would be a definite change. I, for one,
lars and sacrificed many of our young see no reason why a Russian threat to
airmen in the famed airlift which stood sign a separate peace treaty with East
forth as a symbol before the world that Germany should cause us to change our
we act on what we say.
course.
This is no time for weakness. It is
Of course, I have no quarrel with the
a time for a cold, realistic clarification majority leader's right to express his
of where we stand, what we propose to opm10n. In our justly cherished free
do, and what we expect the U.S.S.R. society with opportunity for debate and
to do.
free expression, all viewpoints must be
Mr. Khrushchev continues to make explored and given due weight. This
the cold war colder, and abuse of the country of ours is the greatest and
United States has been one of the prin- strongest on earth. It was made that
cipal methods he has used to discredit way through the qualities of courage, inand belittle the United States.
telligence, morality, and plain common
At all times we must maintain our sense of individual Americans.
honor, respect, and prestige. VVe cannot
VVe are, perhaps, sometimes slow to
for a moment back down on Berlin. act, and too often leave the impression
American leadership in world affairs that we are soft. But the world is bewould be greatly weakened.
ginning to understand that humanity is
If history has taught us anything, it not softness-that the fiber of America
has shown that where peace is con- is no less strong than it was in 1776.
cerned there can be no vacillation or reOur military posture, our domestic
treat.
prosperity, in fact, our very survival as
Mr. President, it seems to me that now a Nation, are affected by success or failis the time to take a forceful step in the ure in the conduct of our foreign reladirection of respect by making it def- tions. In my opinion, any weakening of
initely known, once again, that our po- our position on Berlin would constitute
sition on Berlin has not changed.
a major foreign policy failure.
Berlin represents one of the few reRegardless of the zigs and zags of Rusmaining symbols of the free world's de- sian diplomacy, regardless of their
termination not to be cowed by the bully frowns and smiles, we must never fortactics of the Russian bear.
get that the Communist goal always reBriefly, our position on the future of mains to make the world bow down beGermany and the issue of Berlin has fore the hammer and sickle. So, in my
judgment we should not retreat on Berbeen that:
First. East and VVest Berlin should be lin.
If we back down in any degree on Berunited by free elections, and the city's
freedom should be guaranteed by the lin, I doubt that many nations of the
United States, France, Britain, and the earth will count on our word again.
Soviet Union until such time as Berlin And, in my opinion, we cannot afford to
becomes the capital of a reunited Ger- stand alone.
First things must come first. The
many.
Second. German reunification would urgency of the moment, I repeat, is surbecome a fact with the election of an vival itself. The people of this country
all-German parliament, formation of an must prepare themselves for a rough and
all-German government, conclusion of a tough road ahead; but they cannot expeace treaty between Germany and her pect the Nation to wipe away each of
former enemies, and withdrawal of all their tears.
I cannot in good conscience, Mr.
foreign troops under adequate safePresident, let the proposed new status
guards.
of Berlin pass without my opposition.
Again, I point out, these have been And I shall vigorously and strenuously
basic objectives of our foreign policy oppose any change which would weaken
through the administrations of Presi- our position, until the very end.
dents
Truman,
Eisenhower,
and
In conclusion, let me state that the
Kennedy.
threat to the United States is many
In reporting on his Vienna talks with sided. One is by internal subversion ;
Premier Khrushchev, Mr. Kennedy re- another, by economic penetration; othaffirmed our intention not to be intim- . ers, by espionage, blackmail, and miliidated into backing out of VVest Berlin. tary might. But there is still anotherVVhat Mr. Kennedy told us sounded like an important one-and that is a show
tough, straight-from-the-shoulder talk, of weakness which might be taken as
as indicated by this excerpt from his re- appeasement.
And, appeasement is
marks:
nothing more than surrender on the inI made it clear to Mr. Khrushchev that stallment plan.
the security or Western Europe and thereFor that reason, I am utterly opposed
tore our own security are deeply involved in
to changing our position on Berlin.
our presence and our access rights to West
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President,
Berlin; that these rights are based on law,
not on sufferance; and that we are deter- first, I wish to express to my friend,
mined to maintain these rights at any risk the distinguished senior Senator from
and thus our obligation to the people or West New Hampshire [Mr. BRIDGES], who is
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the ranking Republican Member of this
body, my d eep appreciation and thanks
for the speech he has made this afternoon, and 1 desire to compliment him
for the high tone in which it was delivered.
Whether one speaks for or against
the proposal advanced by the senior
Senator from Montana is immaterial.
The point is that we ought to speak and
think and cogitate while there is still
time to do so, and in an unemotional
way. Time is of the essence in connection with this matter. In my opinion,
the distinguished senior Senator from
New Hampshire has rendered the country and the Senate a service, today, in
bringing to our attention his views on
this question, the most important immediate question of our time.
The Senator from New Hampshire
was gracious enough to tell me ahead
of time that he was going to make his
speech, and to furnish me with a copy
of his remarks.
If I may, I should like to make a few
comments on what he has said, and
then make some comments of my own.
For example, the Senator from New
Hampshire stated:

public of Austria. In fact, Ambassador
Thompson spent so much time on the
treaty that he was almost always in
London, trying there to work out the
arrangements, and rarely was in Vienna.
Later in his remarks the distinguished
Senator from New Hampshire said:

and most of all , which our enemies can
understand.

Our military posture, our domestic prosperity, In !act, our very survival as a nation,
are affected by success or failure In the conduct of our foreign relations. In my opinIon, any weakening of our position on Berlln
would constitute a major foreign pollcy
!allure.

This is no time for weakness. It Is a time
for cold, realistic clarification of where we
stand, what we propose to do, and what we
expect the U.S.S.R. tn do.

I agree completely.
Further on in his speech, the Senator
from New Hampshire stated:
If history has taught us anything, It has
shown that where peace is concerned there
can be no vacilia tlon or retreat.

Again I wholeheartedly agree.
Further on in his speech my friend had
the following to say:
The distinguished majority leader's suggestion If It ever came to pass, would be a
definite change.
I, for one, see no reason why a Russian
threat to sign a separate peace treaty with
East Germany should cause us to change
our course.

Let me say that that possibility had
nothing to do with the remarks I made
The safety and protection of the Ameri- last week, because if I correctly undercan people transcend all considerations of stand the historical situation, whenever
political parties. The least we can do for the Soviet Union desires to sign a treaty
the American people is to give them all the of peace with East Germany, it can do
facts and let them know where they stand so, and there would be nothing that we
In this hour of continued crisis.
We nave h a d a desperate need for a or our allies could do about it.
Further on, the Senator from New
foreign policy which Americans can understand-and which our allies understand- Hampshire said:
I agree completely with the distinguished Senator from New Hampshire.
A little later he said:
Last Wednesday, the distinguished senior
Senator from Montana delivered In the Senate an Important address. during the course
or which he advanced one solution to the
problem. While he made clear he was
speaking for himself. he still Is known as
his pe.rty's spokesman In the Senate. This
proposal was that Berlin, East and West,
might be reunited as a "free city," to be held
In trust by an international authority.

At this time, I should like to read an
excerpt from an editorial published in
the Christian Science Monitor on June
17, 1961. I believe that these few words,
more than anything else I have read or
heard, sum up what I was trying to do
when I was privileged to address the
I appreciate what my friend. the Senate, last Wednesday, on this quesSenator from New Hampshire, has said tion. I quote now from the editorial:
In this respect the proposals advanced in
relative to his acknowledgment of the
the U.S. Senate by Senator MIKE MANSFIELD,
fact that I was speaking for myself, be- o!
Montana, a day before the Khrushchev
cause I was; and, as a matter of fact, broadcast make a great deal of sense. These
to this day I have not discussed this mat- proposals, which are put forward by the
ter with either the President of the Senate majority leader personally and not on
United States or the Secretary of State, behalf of the Kennedy administration, should
because I feel that I have some responsi- be readbilities as a Senator of the United States.
And I wish to direct the attention of
A little later. the Senator made refer- the Senator to thisence to the Trieste agreement. He said: should be read not as a substitute for !ull
The Trieste agreement. for example, was
signed February 10. 1947, and held as a
"free territory" under United Nations
supervision. By October 5, 1954, tt was
divided up between Yugoslavia and Italy and
the "free territory" is no more. Yugoslavia
got what It wanted of the "free territory."

insistence on Western rights in West Berlin
but as a poss1ble supplement to the AngloFrench-American diplomatic position.

Further on, the distinguished senwr
Senator from New Hampshire says:
First things must come first.

The urgency

Let me call to the attention of the of the moment, I repeat, Is survival itsel!.
Senate the fact that that treaty, which The people of this country must prepare
seems to have been agreed to by both themselves for a rough road ahead, but they
expect the Nation to wipe away each
Italy and Yugoslavia as being eminently cannot
o! their tears.
satisfactory at that time, came about beI cannot In good conscience, Mr. President,
cause of the outstanding work done in let the proposed new status o! Berlin pass
its behalf by Clare Boothe Luce, who at without my opposition. And, I shall vigorthat time was U.S. Ambassador to Italy, ously and strenuously oppose any change
and by Llewellyn Thompson, who at that which would weaken our position, untll the
time was U.S. Ambassador to the Re- very end.

June 20

I can find no real argument there, because I do not think that I was P;dvocating a weakening of our position in Berlin, or a backing away, or a retreat, in
the proposal which I advanced. As the
Christian Science Monitor indicated, I
was trying to bring about a possible supplemental position insofar as our status
in that area was concerned.
There has been some reference to the
fact that I am the majority party's
spokesman in the Senate. I do not know
how to answer this. I suppose that is
a cross I have to bear on occasion, just
as the distinguished minority leader has
to bear a somewhat similar burden if he
makes a speech and is thereby considered as the spokesman of his party. But
let me say, knowing the 100 Senators of
this body, no Senator can speak for any
other Senator. So far as we are concerned, leader or not, we are on an equal
basis. ·
Before any Senator is a majority leader, he is the Senator of the State from
which he comes, and he is a Senator of
the United States. Before a Senator
has responsibilities to any administration, he has responsibilities to the people of the United States in the light of
his conscience.
Several days ago I made a statement
on Berlin as a Senator from Montana,
as one s ·enator with responsibilities to
the people of his State and the Nation.
The statement was not at any time, or
in any way, discussed in advance with
any person in the executive branch. It
was not intended as praise for this administration or criticism of its predecessor. And it was, in no sense, a "trial balloon."
The statement proposed that we face
the facts of the situation which is developing at Berlin and that we face them
now and discuss them fully, just as the
distinguished Senator from New Hampshire did in his service to the country this
afternoon.
It contained a proposal
which suggested a third way on Berlinneither that which the Soviet Union has
proposed nor that which presently exists. The statement was designed to invite discussion in the Senate of this
grave situation and to elicit further proposals with respect to that situation. For
in this matter, the Senate has a responsibility, even as the President of the
United States has the ultimate responsibilty.
The developments in Berlin involve the
entire future of the United States, the
Soviet Union, Europe, and the world.
Therefore I trust that any discussion
will reflect the seriousness and soberness
of this situation. And I trust, furthermore, that the discussion will not be
bent to political purposes.
Let me say again that I commend and
compliment the Senator from New
Hampshire for the nonpartisan, frank,
and honest way in which he discussed
his reaction to the Berlin situation on
the floor of the Senate this afternoon.
Finally, I trust that we will bear in
mind in this discussion the weight of responsibility which rests on the shoulders
of the President. He must make decisions on behalf of all of us-decisions
which bind us all. He must make these
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decisi.ons knowing that, in the end, if
reasvi1 fails, either here or elsewhere,
wha~ may be. involved is the life of every
man, woman, and child in the Nation.
I n these circumstances, every responsible citizen of this Nation , and especially
those with public responsibilities, will
think and speak with the soberness the
situation requires. That, may I say, was
characteristic of the discussion in the
senate on the part of both Republican
and Democratic Senators after my statement the other day. And I hope that lt
is a characteristic which will be maintained as this discussion widens, and I
am sure it will be, based on the statement by the Senator from New Hampshire this afternoon.
Following my previous speech I received a large response, for a Senator
from Montana, in the mail. More than
h alf the letters I received were from
Texas, California, New York, Illinois,
and Pennsylvania. The letters were unfavorable to the proposals which I made
on Berlin in a ratio of about 4 to 1.
A great many of these letters contained attacks on my integrity, motives,
and patriotism. I do not relish these
attacks, since my skin is no thicker than
that of any other Senator. But if personal vilification is the price which must
be paid for full public discussion of this
critical issue, then it will be paid, regardless of whether the discussion tends
to support my view, or oppose it, or take
some other turn.
Mr. BRIDGES. Mr. President, will the
Senator yield?
Mr. MANSFIELD. I yield.
Mr. BRIDGES. As the distinguished
Senator knows full well, speaking for myself, and I think for most people of this
country, and certainly for my colleagues
on this side of the aisle, there is no question about the integrity or patriotism of
the Senator from Montana, or his effort
to do what he considers in his conscience
to be for the best interests of this country. I for one am very happy the Senator from Montana occupies the position
that he does. I happen to differ with
him on his approach, but I know his motives are of the highest, and I am sorry
anyone would vilify him or question his
motives in the discussion of this issue.
Mr. MANSFIELD. I am deeply grateful to my friend, the distinguished Senator from New Hampshire, for these remarks; but as far as my colleagues in
this body are concerned, I have no doubt
that every Member feels toward me as I
feel towards them-and I say this with
all due modesty-as the Senator from
New Hampshire has expressed himself,
because I think we get to know one another here and to have an understanding
of the problems and confrontations
which occur from time to time.
I do not mind this criticism, and I did
not rise to protest it. All of us, being
in the profession we are in, have to anticipate some criticism. If we were not
criticized, I would say there was some- '
thing wrong with us, because nobody in .\
this Chamber or anywhere else can advance proposals which will meet with the
full approval of the people of this country
or with the full approval of the people of
No.103--5

a State, and neither can anyone vote
'Vithout that chance, because there is always someone who will criticize. That
is fine. I only hope that when criticism
is made it will be made on the basis of the
criticism advanced by the distinguished
Senator from New Hampshire, which is
criticism of a constructive nature, because on that basis we can all benefit and
the country will be better off.
Mr. President, the issue which confronts the people of this Nation at Berlin
is fundamental. We are fully committed
at Berlin, all of us, and lest there be any
misunderstanding of this commitment,
I repeat what I said last Wednesday:
We will not be driven, pushed or barred
from fulfilling our responsibilities to ourselves and to freedom in Berlln by any nation, half-nation, group of nations or whatever. Such measures as may be necessary to
assert that responsibllity will be taken. • • •
The range of this commitment extends from
a beginning of the words of firmness to a
midpoint of expenditure of immense resoures and enormous taxes and other sacr!fices, to a final pledge of the lives and
fortunes of every man, woman and child in
the Nation.
I do not take this commitment lightly.
And because I do not, Mr. President, I
regard it as an inescapable responsibility
on the part of the Senate to see to it that
the question of Berlin is discussed fully
and completely and in advance of payment on the commitment. So long as I
repreesnt the State of Montana as a
Senator of the United States, I shall not
regard as closed and beyond discussion
any matter which involves the welfare
and the very life of every citizen of this
Nation as directly as does the Berlin
situation. And I shall speak out on these
matters whenever m y judgment · and
conscience compel it.
In my statement last Wednesday I
offered a proposal for a possible approach
to solution of the Berlin question. It
was neither the way suggested by Mr.
Khrushchev nor merely a continuance
of the status quo in that city. It was an
attempt to find a third way, not in retreat from where we now stand but in an
advance to what I believe may be a firmer
ground for peace in Europe. I have based
this proposal on the assumption that if
West Berlin is defensible as a free city,
as an allied enclave 110 miles inside the
communist world , all Berlin as a free city
would be even more defensible if it is
threatened, for it would still be backed
by allied guarantees. as is now the case,
and, in addition, by the weight of a world
opinion which is overwhelming for
peace. The small garrisons in West
Berlin, Mr. President, are not what defends that city-it is the allied guarantees of that city's safety, and these will
be strengthened, not weakened, under
the proposals which I have made , even
though some of the interpretations of
these proposals m ay for one reason or
another suggest otherwise. I have based
these proposals, furthermore, on the belief that any policy which, in effect, insists that the Russian s remain in Berlin
and Germany, as ours now does, is not
only impracticable but also wrong on its
face, for our object must be to encourage
the withdrawal of Soviet forces eastward

if the pr::!sent costly stalemate in Europe

is ever to be brought to an end.
The suggestions which I have made
may or may not have merit. They were
obviously not intended to be the last
word on this subject. Other proposals
may be cffered by other Members which
may or may not have merit. More important than any particular proposals,
mine or those of anyone else, is that this
issue and its possible solution be
thoroughly explored and, one would
hope, explored without rancor or considerations of political advantage, in the
light of the best interests of this Nation. As I see it, Mr. President, it is not
in the best interests of this Nation to
go on spending billions of dollars abroad
without bringing closer the day when
these one-sided expenditures may be
terminated in a more constructive situation-and Berlin alone and directly has
already cost this Nation in excess of $1.5
billion. It is not in the best interests of this Nation to spend the lives
of citizens and to risk the devastation
of this Nation and the word if we can
create a situation where this need will be
obviated.
To be sure, there may be no alternative. To be sure, in the end we may
have no choice but to spend the billions
and the lives, but until that end arrives,
I , for one, shall go on seeking a better
way.
I do not now believe and have never
believed in change for the sake of change
in public policy any more than in automobiles. But I believe it is essential to
the security and welfare of the people of
this Nation that we do not doom ourselves to the mental prison of equating
all change with retreat and defeat. For
in foreign policy, no less than in all
other aspects of human existence,
an ordered change is the key to rational
survival and progress. Unless we are
not afraid, first, to consider changes in a
world of change and, second, to make
changes if reason tells us they should be
made, we shall find ourselves, in foreign
policy, time and again in pursuit of the
last car of a train that is always pulling
away from us.
Mr. President, again I commend the
Senator from New Hampshire. In my
opinion he has performed a real public
service this afternoon.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that a number of editorials both for
and against the proposal advanced by
me last week in the Senate be printed
in the RECORD at the conclusion of my
remarks.
There being no objection, the material
was ordered to be printed in the RECORD,
as follows :
[From the Christian Science Monitor.
June 17, 1961 1
IF Moscow

REALLY

WANTS

A

GERMAN

TREATY

Premier Khrushchev's report to the people of the Soviet Union on his talks at
Vienna with President Kennedy Is a new
statement o! old pretensions. These preten sions do not take on any more validity from
the fact that they have been voiced for 2 1 2
years, but there Is danger of their becoming
partly accepted by familiarity.
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The head of thn C
bloc says,
"The absence of a pe tce treaty with Germany has created a d'~ply abnormal and
dn.ngerous situation 1n Europe." He adds
the charge that Britain, France, and the
United States broke postwar agreements by
turning West Germany Into a milltarlst
state, whereas the facts are the Soviet authorittes first closed off their occupation
zone and began there deYelopment of paramtlltary forces under the Soviet Army.
Thus began the problem of a divided Germany and of a Communist puppet regime in
East Germany which has no basis in the
wishes of the people but ruled by Russianbacked force. That is "a deeply abnormal
and dangerous situation" but it is not the
one Mr. Khrushchev llkes to talk about.
He prefers to focus attention on West
Berlin, where he proposes what would technically be called a free city but which
would, In fact, end the freedom of more than
2 million West Berliners within a few years.
Unless that proposal Is accepted, he threatens before the end of the year to make a
treaty with his pawns, Walter Ulbricht and
company, which be pretends would give them
complete control over access to Berlln.
COMMUNIST PLANS FOrt WEST BERLIN

If they used that control with scrupulous

respect !or the rights of West Berliners to
oome and go, and for the rights or others
to visit and trade with them, the situation
would not be materially worsened. But
what Mr. Ulbricht has In mind Is Indicated
by a press conference In which be suggests
that the Tempelho! Airport, which was West
Berlln 's llfellne In the blockade o! 1948, be
closed, and that West Berlin cease to grant
asylum to East German refugees.
What Mr. Khrushchev envisages can be
Inferred from his parrot!ng of a completely
fictitious Communist claim that the half
city of West Berlin "is situated on territory
of the German Democratic [East German [
Republic." There was no East German
state when the postwar outllnes of Berlin
were drawn. As a matter or fact, especially
if they protest a. West German Parliament
meeting ln West Berlin, the Communists
have no right to install the East German
Government In East Berlin, since even the
Soviet sector or that city Is on a different
legal footing from the Soviet occupation
zone around it.
In this respect the proposals advanced In
the United States Senate by Senator Mike
Mansfield of Montana a day before the Khrushchev broadcast makE! a great deal of sense.
These proposals, which are put forward by
the Senate majority leader personally and
not on behalf o! the Kennedy administration. should be read not as a subsltute for
full Insistence on Western rights In West
Berlin but as a possible supplement to the
Anglo-French-American diplomatic position.
CONCESSIONS AND COUNTERCONCESSIONS

So long as Soviet arrogance tries to undermine the safety or West Berlin and its people (with stratagems reminiscent or the Nazi
encompassment and capture of the free city
of Danzig) the West should stand flatly on
every sentence and comma of Its occupation
rights in defense of the West Berliners.
One of the hollow aspects or the Khrushchev position Is the pretense that Moscow
seeks a peace treaty as to all of Germany
In conjunction with Its wartime allies. If
this were more than a sham, the Kremlln
would deal seriously with the Western contention that the whole German people
should have an opportunity to vote on their
future status.
If Mr. Khrushchev and his foreign office
have any thought or achieving an agreed
settlement on the narrower and Included
question of Berlln, they might consider what
arrangements In return could conceivably
compensate for the concessions they ask and
provide rellable safeguards for the people of

West Berlln. This, In efl'ect, Is what the
Mansfield plan asks the Communists--or
others who pass judgment on Issues of the
cold war-to do.
First, for example, 1! a free and lnternatlonallzed status would be good for half a
city (West Berlln), why would It not be at
least twice as good for a whole city, including
East Berlln? The first postulate that should
be laid, therefore, In any thought of changed
conditions for Berlln is that the change
should apply to the whole city.
REAL INTERNATIONAL AUTHORITY NEEDED

Even that would be far from enough to
assure the security of the city's government
or the ultimate physical safety of Its citizens.
Earller statements have suggested that some
international authority guarantee the neutrallty and self-government of West Berlin.
The only authority remotely capable of doing
this-and Its capability In such a greatpower vise would br very doubtful until
proved In other cases-would be the United
Nations. Yet the Unite<! Nations would certainly be estopped from giving any effective
protection to an area such as Berlin If Mr.
Khrushchev should succeed In introducing
his fragmentation of the secretariat by a
three-party veto.
The residents of Berlln also would need
absolutely dependable and even enlarged
guarantees of freedom of passage for themset ves, their goods, and their guests going to
and from Berlin through the 110-mile corridor to West Germany. As to this, Mr.
Khrushchev says with one breath that the
Soviet Union favors free access and with the
next breath that the East German Communists could take it away.
The Mansfield formula Is that the city's
neutrality be guaranteed by the members
both of the North Atlantic Treaty and the
Warsaw Pact, and that Western access routes
to the city be garrisoned with International
peace teams.
These points, It should be recognized, are
counterproposals to the Soviet demands, not
modifications of the American, French, and
British insistence on their right to protect
West Berllners at the West Berllners' request.
Incidentally, one translation has Premier
Khrushchev saying, "The Western powers
say they will Insist on their rights In West
Berlln. TI>at is a threat to peace." Since
when did it become a threat to peace for any
nation to Insist on its rights? The official
Tass version has smoothed up this passage,
but the characterization Is essentially true
of the Communist position.
CHANGES SHOULD NOT BE ONE SIDED

Premier Khrushchev goes out of his way
to say that I! any country "violates peace
and crosses the borders" of East Germany
It will be met with Soviet weapons. President Kennedy expllcltly assured the Soviet
leader at Vienna that so long as the rights
or access are respected there would be no
use of force. But If either Soviet or East
German authorities should Interpose barriers. that would be the In! tlal use of force.
The Communists have no moral or other
right to demand that the West sacrifice the
safety and liberties of 2 million people even
In the name of peace-that Is, to dissuade
the Communists from breaking the peace.
Theoretically, It Is quite possible to
imagine a better and more stable situation for Berlln than now exists. But to
accomplish this would require substantial
concessions from both sides, not just from
one. If a bargain Is to be struck, it should
be for the benefit of all, particularly the
West Berliners. If Moscow expects the West
to consider modification, it should be willIng to consider equally important and t;noce
necessary ones.
Only on this basis should the Western
three powers contemplate any bargaining
about Berlln. Not one cardboard kopeck
should be given up without full value for
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the security of West Berhners in return. If
any one calls his Intransigeance, let him
ask If he would llke his own security dealt
with on any other basis.
Viewed as an exercise In analysis of what
guarantees the Communists ought to be
willing to give in return !or what they new
are brashly and brazenly demanding, the
Mansfield plan has value. It should not
be regarded in any other light, certainly
not as any weakening of Western resistance
to attempted intimidation.
[From the Washington Daily News, June 16,
19Gl]
BERLIN DJLEMMA

Senate Majority Leader MANSFIELD has
contributed an idea to the latest battle over
Berlln
He says Nlkita Khrushchev's propJ)sal to
convert West Berlln Into a free city and
to kick out the Western powers Is unacceptable. But he adas that the Western
pollcy of standing on the status quo Is not
necessary the way to peace.
A third way, he suggests, might be to
convert the entire city-East and WestInto a free city; "held in trust and in peace
by some International authority until such
time as it Is again the capital of Germany."
Access routes to the city would be guarded
by International peace teams.
Senator MANSFIELD's suggestion has the
merit of some fresh thinking on a problem
that has plagued the world since the end ot
the war and perlodlcally becomes a dangerous crisis area. Khrushchev indicates he Is
heading for another flash crisis there at the
end of this year.
The Senate leader also calls for widespread
discussion and debate about the Berlin p r oblem. The best place to start would be at the
beginning-way back In the late 1940's-to
refresh the world's memory on why Berlln
exists today in an extremely abnormal state.
To listen to Moscow, this Is all the fault of
the Western powers and the West Berliners.
The fact Is that the Soviets, in 1948, walked
out of the four-power (United States, Brt taln, France, Russia) K ommandatura, after
they got the short end of a free, Berlin-wide
election. They set up their own puppet
municipal regime in East Berlln and thus
divided the city In two. They even cut the
telephone cables between the two halves or
the city. Even today It Is Impossible to
make a telephone call between East and West
Berlln.
There is going to be a lot of shouting about
Berhn In the months ahead and the world
should be reminded how the present situation developed.
It Is difficult to believe that anyone who
knows the facts about Berlln--or who bas
had the fascinating experience of seeing that
divided city--ever could give even second
thoughts to Khrushchev's outrageous proposal.
[From the Washington Post. June 16, 19611
SONG BY THE FIRESIDE

It's all very simple. If the United States
and the West will just agree to Soviet pollcy
on Berlln, Laos, the United Nations, nuclear
tests and disarmament, we'll all coexist
splendidly. Last one to gl ve In is a warmonger.
That, in essence, represents the chatty content of Mr. Khrushchev's fireside chat to
the Soviet people. He expressed satisfaction over his talks with President Kennedy
in Vienna; but the satisfaction, If any, must
have derived principally from the opportunity to clarify what are almost completely
opposite positions. From the standpoint of
the United States and Its allies, about the
only reasonable aspect of Mr. Khrushchev's
presentation was its relatively restrained
tone.
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The Soviet leader has adopted the troika
as his mode of international conveyance to
the United Nations, nuclear tests and virtually every other issue. He wants general
and complete disarmament, and unless his
terms are accepted the United States IS
against it. He wants a neutral an d Independent Laos, but the Americans are somehow responsible for the continued truce
violations by the Communist Pathet Lao.
The Soviet Union does not want a war, but
it is going to sign a treaty this year g iving
control of the access to Berlin to East Germany, and anyone who res ists will be guil ty
of aggression.
Well, it is a pretty dismal line-about as
reasonable as the sort of stuff once ~ pouted
by a fe llow named Hitler. Berlin is of
course the most troublesome issue, and
there is considerable point to Senator MIKF:
MANSFIELD's call for the West to ab:mdon
some of its fictions about the problem and
seck to mount son1e counterpres~urc for
improved status of Berlin. But to use a
Soviet metaphor. the chance of anything
better, in Mr. Khrushchev's pre,ent mood,
seems about as likely a• fr ied snowballs.
All of which means that the West had better
prepare for a tough test of n~rvcs this fall.
JFrom the New York Herald Tribune, Jun e
17,19611
ACHESON HEADS TASK FORCE To WATCH
BERLIN

(By Marguerite Higgins)
WASHINGTON, June 16.-Pres ident Kennedy
has formed a special task force to keep watch
on the Berlin crisis. It Is headed by former
Secretary of State Dean Acheson.
Mr. Acheson, who is widely known for his
tough unyielding stand on maintaining the
freedom of West Berlin, is currently completing a report on the alternative resp on ses
open to the West in light of heightening Soviet pressure designed to drive the Allies out
of the city.
After the report is finished Mr. Acheson
Is expected to serve as the administration's
chief crisis watcher on the Berlin situation,
ready to give warning and advice on a ll new
developments.
ENCOURAGES BERLIN

The key role on Berlln to be played by Mr.
Acheson Is particularly welcome to the West
Germans, who In the past few days have been
fretful over reports of alleged changes in
American policy.
In fact, the State Department has spent
much of this week trying to calm fears
aroused:
1. By a speech In which Senator MrKE
MANSFIELD, Democrat, of Montana, Senate
majority leader, proposed accepting the
"free city" idea for West Berlin if the same
system were extended to East Berlin. This
alarms the West Germans, who feel psychologically that the physical presence of
Americans In Berlin Is the best deterrent to
Russian action against the city. Under the
Mansfield Idea, all Allled occupation troops,
Including American, would In due course
leave Berlin.
2. By reports out of London that the
United States was contemplating a radical
new approach to Berlin.
The State Department has diplomatically
disowned the Mansfield Idea and denied that
it was In any sense an administration trial
balloon- a conclusion drawn by most European papers. It also denied that any radical new approach on Berlin was contemplated.
Mr. Acheson's assignment to the Berlin
problem will be a reassurance to the Europeans in itself, for he agreed completely
with West German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer In opposing Soviet desires to make
unllateral changes In Berlin's status.
Mr. Acheson is on record as saying: "The
presen t status of the Western Allies in Ber-

lin is highly satisfactory. Why fuss a round
wich other ideas? Premier Khrushchev is
t11e only one who wants it changed."
U.S. REPLY IS FIRM

The American reply to Mr. Khrushchev's
most recent memorandum on Berlin was the
s ubject of consultation here today with both
Brit-ain and France. The American draft
reply is firm, refuses to contemplate the
ch:tnges proposed by the Russians, but leaves
the door slightly ajar for negotiations on
the issue.
Mr. Acheson will be assisted in his Berlin
tasl< force mainly by specialists from within the administration such as Walt Whitman Rostow, deputy White House assistant
on no.tional security affairs; Foy Kohler, Assistant Secretary of State for Europ0an Mattr·~·s,

and others.

Tilc:·e have been unconfirmed reports that
Gen. Lucius D. Clay, the con1n1andcr in Europe during the Berlin blockade of 1948 ,
m ight be included in the task force of crisiswatchers because he has had decision-m~k
ing experience in dealing with Soviet pres-

sure. It was not ru:cd out at the White
H ouse today that General Clay might be
consulted, b ut his aid hns as yet not been
requested.
JFrom the New York Post, June 18. 19611
SENATOR MAN SFI ELD'S I-!EaESY

Once again Senate Majority Leader MANSFIELD, Democrat, of Montana, h as made a
valio.nt effort to generate fresh thought on
the problem of Berlin and rescue the West
from the peril of its own cliches. His suggestion that the status quo in the divided
Germa.n city is not sacrosanct seems to have
sel1t a shudder of horror through Bonn and
provoked frenzy in the top echelons of the
GOP. It desenes a more responsible hearing.
M' NSFIELD's proposal, similar to a plan he
ad vocated 2 years ago, would erase the line
between East and West Berlin and unify the
two sectors as one city whose freedom and
acccssability would be internationally guaranteed by NATO, the Warsaw Pact countries
and b oth West and East Germany. In view
of Mr. Khrushchev's drive to sign a peace
treaty with the German Communist regime
and t ransfer to it the responsibility for keeping West Berlin's communications lines open
to the free world, MANSFIELD's plan might
honorably save the city from the attrition
that Communist leader Ulbricht has outlined. It might also avert an explosive
world crisis.
Our adamant insistence that a position
adopted more than a decade ago must remain unchanged despite a major shift in the
East-West balance of power plainly remains
the battlecry of West German politicians; no
one dares to question the formula. But must
German Internal politics mute all debate
here? Is no new Idea tolerable? Must we
sit back and wait for Khrushchev to set
the timetable of crisis?
Senator MANSFIELD is basically asking
whether we can properly ignore the possibility of a third way out of the dangerous
Berlin deadlock . He sees more clearly than
most Western statesmen that to stand firm
on Berlin while it remains a pivot of new
disaster for m ankind may be a fetish rather
than a policy. When and how the flashpoint will be reached, as Joseph Barry notes
in his dispatch from Paris on magazine page
9, no one precisely knows. Nor is there any
allied agreement on h ow to recognize it, to
say nothing Of h andling it. MANSFIELD'S
thtrd way provides hope that the explosive
issue can be solved without either side surrendering any crucial principle or special
advantage.
The proposal is not, as Senator DmKSEN
and Representative HALLECK were so quick
to charge, o. renunciation of our pledge to
defend West Berlin. Neither does It mean
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abandonment of Germany's hope of eventual reunification-for which, incidentally,
there is more lipservice than real longing in
today's prosperous Federal Republic. It
s imply reflects, as MANSFIELD stated, an
"honest recognition of the fact that it is too
late in the game to expect that Germany
will be reunified in peace by fiat of the
United State, France, Great Britain, and
Russia, as was expected 15 years ago."
MANSFrELD wants to do more to presen·e
B erlin as a symbol of freedom than issue
periodic declarations of our fidelity.
If it is said that his plan is unacceptable
because it may Involve the recogmtlon of
East Germany, which is one of Mr. Khrushchev's goals, let us not panic. Nonrecognition of the Communist regime is one of
Dr. Adenauer's most percious pieties. But
in terms of world peace and Berlin's freedom, it may also be one of the most dispensable.
Admittedly there are hazards inYOI\"Cd in
Senator MANSF"IELD's proposal, but Senator
CASE, Republican, of South Dakota, obsen·ed
sanely that it was a good starting point for
exploration.
And that is the vital point. Reasonable
men may differ on the merits or practicality
of MANSFIELD's ideas. What is inexcusable
is the suggestion that he was guilty of some
high crime by bringing up the subject. In
a world as precarious as ours, no man has
the right to say that the last word has been
spoken on any great issue.
{This editorial was broadcast on June 15.
1961, over WRDW Television, Augusta, Ga.)
This is a WRDW-TV editorial.
"Berlin is likely to become the pivot of a
new disaster f or mankind"-these 13 words
concluded an address made by Senate Maj ority Leader MIKE MANSFIELD on the floor
of the U.S. Senate. In that address Mr.
MANSFIELD suggested a third alternative in
the Berlin situation.
The Senator stated that he did not believe
that "the way to peace can be found either
in the maintenance of the status quo In
Berlin or in the change which Mr. Khrushchev proposes."
Senator MANSFIELD suggests that the entire city of Berlin be put under an International trusteeship. Under such a plan,
routes of access would be garrisoned by international peace teams • • • both East and
West governments would pay the cost of such
an arrangement under written agreements,
and the in terim status would be guaranteed by the NATO and Warsaw Pact countries. Such a change in Berlin would be terribly difficult, but as the Senator put it, "It
is not really, an infinitesimal task when compared with the full implications of an
essay in military solution with what comes
after lt."
As Mr. MANSFIELD states, "This approach
may evoke no response from Mr. Khrushchev.
But does Mr. Khrushchev's reactions, whatever they may be, dissolve us from ou r rational responsibilities to ourselves and to
thb world in this situation."
Mr. MANSFIELD has thought well when he
says, "If the present positions of the parties
concerned remain unchanged, sooner or later,
this crisis postponed, this crisis avoided, wi!l
cease to lie dormant. If we wait for the
moment of heat, It may be too late to Lhink
at all."
The Montana Senator concluded, "Sooner
or later the Western nations and the Soviet
Union must seek a new way, a third way to
the solution or the Berlin problem. Unless
this search is pursued with energy and dispatch and to frui tion, sooner or later, Berlin is likely to become the pivot of a new
disaster for mankind."
Once again, we feel that Senator MANSFIELD has displayed cogent observance and
realistic approach and we would agree wholeheartedly with his Berlin proposal.

This was a WRDW-TV editorial, Jack Belt,
speaking f()I" WRDW Television.
(From the Washington Evening Star, June
18, 1001 I

BE:RLIN
as Premier KhrUshchev says, the lack
of ;, German peace treaty "keeps alive the
smoldering coals or World War II," then Berlin Is the bellows that could enfiame the
world In another conflagration.
During the 16 years Germany and Berlin
have been divided, the Russians have had
only to squeeze the bellows and world tenstons have flared anew
Premier Khrushchev fanned the flames
a.gam last week In calling for a peace treaty
which would recognize formally the existence or two German states and end the
West's occupation rights In West Berlin. Mr.
Khrushchev said If the West was willing to
sign such a treMy then he woUld help
guarantee West Berlin's existence as a free
ctty, with necessary access routes
If the West does not join the Sovtet Union.
however, In signing such a treaty, he satd
the Russians would sign unllaterally with
the East Germans before the end of the
year. This would force the West to make Its
own arrangements with the East Germans, a
situation obsen·ers rear might lead to war
1 r the East Germans try to block access routes
to the ctty.
In Ills latest speech, Premier Khrushchev
satd "the conclusion or a peace treaty wtth
Germany cannot be postponed any longer.
A peaceful settlement In Europe must be attained this year ..
The Prcmter's haste Is due apparently to
a rear thnt West Germany might become
so strong It would be willing to start a war
to liberate East Germany or to reclaim
lnnd ceded nt the end of the war to Poland .
To the Wc•t. Mr Khrushchev's rears seem
groundless. but as any visitor to the So,·lct Union can testify. the fear In Russta of
a rearmed Germany Is real Indeed
Premier Khrushchev said a treaty formalIzing the borders could help prevent hostilities which he said would "mean war-and
a thermonuclear war at that."
The United States supports West Germanv's demand for a unified Germany. The
Umted States has no mtentlon or recognizing
East Germany, and President Kennedy has
said no peace treaty would be signed untll
free and universal elections wPre held
throughout Germany
President Kennedy said 2 weeks ago that
"we arc not seeking to change the present
s1tua.t1on" m which allied troops nrc stationed 1n West Berlin and have access rights
~uaran teed by treaty with the Russ~:ms. In a
Soviet-East German treaty there Is an implied threat that war might break out over
access r~gh ts If the East Germans try another Berlin blockade.
W1th little compromise VISible In these
conflicting views, Senate Majority Leader
MA,.,SFIH.u brought a fresh approach to the
subject in urging that all or Berlin be made
a free c1ty under lnternallonal protection
Th1s , he said. would be a third way betwe<·n the two pos1t1ons He said It was hls
own 1dea . and not the administration's. The
crmccpt however, met strong opposition .
West Germany 1mmcd1utely rejected the
Idea. because it would "deepen the division"
or Gl'rmany. Observers also doubted if the
M •nsficld propr>-<nl would be acceptable to
the C,>mmumsts who carefully have avoided
mcludmg En..<t Berlin m any plan to set up a
frl'e cny
rmmPdi •te pro.,pccts were for a hardening
of p >51 t1ems and an Increase of post Lions and
.ttl IUCreasc or tensions thts summer There
" ., poss1b1llty that the Russians will call an
11\lcrn ll.mal conference to sign a peace
t ren t\' 111 which ca.se It Is not likely the West

rr

June 20

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD- SENATE

999

[From the New York Times, June 15. 1961 I
DISPUTED AREAS IN THE STATE OF THE UNION
(By Arthur Krock)
WASHINGTON, June 14. -DIJ!erence Of opinIon and full freedom to express and promote
them, supply the life-blood of an open,
creative and free society. This Is no less the
fact because. as Is being widely noted, the
depth and duration or some of these dll!erences among Americans are producing consequences which suit Premier Khrushchev as
well as If he had planned them. But there
are controversies which the President has
the power to settle Insofar as national policy
Is concerned. yet which continue to rage because or the Irresolution or the conflict or
policy
For example. the administration builds up
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization In
Europe, and In the United Nations It weakens
the alliance It Is committed to nonintervention In the Western Hemisphere. but the
administration trained, equipped and transported the ant1-Castro Interventionists In
Cuba And then It denied them the airpower coverage without which this amphibious landing had no chance to succeed.
The Preslden t Is sworn to preserve the
purchasing power or the dollar-specifically
to leave undisturbed the price of gold.
Nevertheless. he has been deluging Congress
with Government spendmg programs for
public welfare projects (of which the current
$6 billion housing bill as submitted Is
typ1cal). each In the same tone or urgency
that confers a No. 1 priority on each. The
administration JUstifies this nonmilitary
deficit spending on the unproved theory
that Its annual stimulation of the national
gross wealth will make it self-liquidating
before It can become lnfiatlonary. And this
calculation Is based on an even shakier
theory-that "real Income" Is produced by
Government spending and private spending
alike. despite the fact that the former can
spend only what It subtracts from the latter.
The administration evaluates the spread
of International communism to West Berlin,
Asta and Africa as a menace which mvst be
resisted by post tl vc and aggressl ve measures,
mcludlng military ones If these are required
to make the resistance effective and are
technically renslble. But Its policy Is wholly
passive toward Cuba, where the Castro government is becoming more and more closely
allied w1th Moscow and by covert and open
acts Is working on other Latin American peoples to follow Its lead Yet no military base
which the United States maintains on the
Russian periphery as a deterrent to Soviet
att.tck on the West Is nearer. or In war more
dangerous potentially, to the Soviet Union
than Cuba Is to the United States.
The President in person has notified Premtcr Khrushchev that we will use force If
ncccss<try to support our occupation rights
and protect the people In West Berlin
a;:amst his plan to make It a free city, with
access facilities transferred to East Germany.
But while, In this grim showdown, our rights
ultimately might survive. West Berlin Itself
might not This is a sober military judgment which calls for new but not surrendertype thinking on an awesome problem. However. the only thinking of this kind revealed
thus far In administration quarters was Senator MANS>IELo's today· a "free city" composed of the two Berllns wl th sound guarantees. which he also spec1ficd
rn sum. the indecisions of the President
and the administratiOn-Indecisions either
because no policy chotec has been made or
because two policies arc running In conflict-already are fostering, In at least six
vital areas of controversy. conse<jucnccs most
stuta.ble to Khrushchev In the s1xth area 1s
the controversy over further prolonging the
Geneva test-ban talks.
Although ( 1) no fallout peril would be
created bv resumln~~: selsmtc or even wean-

States. (21 no check on disarmament would
be tnvol\·ed because the existing stc:lckplles
already are sufficient to destroy civilization.
(3) and members of the Atomic Energy
Commission and the associated Joint Con·
gresslonnl Committees are urging that at a
minimum test preparations be made at once,
the President continues to hesitate.
He has been persuaded that world opinion
would not understand why test resumption
as a measure of vital secu.rlty has been forced
on the United St~tes by the Soviet Union .
Strange that this speculation should so
much Influence a President with his powers
of statement, an Ironclad case and reports
from qualified sources that there are at lea t
200 seismic events a year In Soviet territory
(From the Washington Evening Star, J une
15, 1961 1
BERLIN: A THIRD WAY
In his search for a "third way" In Berlin,
Majority Leader MIKE MANSFIELD rests hiS
case on the unassailable premise that the
deadlock there may "push the Western nations and the Soviet Union Into a new vortex
or Irrationality at whose center lies the
graveyard or humanity." Those on both
sides who say they want to stand pat on
Berlin. come what may, should give serious
consideration to this prospect.
We do not lmow whether Senator MANSFIELD's remarks were of the Inspired "trial
balloon" variety, or whether he was speaking
on his own responslbll!ty. And perhaps It
doesn't matter. The Important thing, Is
that his speech makes sense.
As matters stand, both the West and the
Soviet Union are adhering to Irreconcilable
positions. These positions take little account
or the changes In Europe since the end or
World War II. some 16 years ago. And they
are also positions which, far from serving
real Interests. promise nothing better to all
concerned than the frightful consequences
of a nuclear collision
In this situation, the Montana Senator
calls for the taking of a new look-a search
for a third way In Berlin. Speclflcally, he
thinks that this third way may lie In the
creation or a free city which would encompass not just West Berlin, but all of Berlin.
This free city would be "held In trust and
In peace by some International authority"
until such time as It can again serve as the
capital of Germany, and Its access routes
would be garrisoned by International peace
teams. Meanwhile. the hope would be that
the East and the West Germans could work
out their own unification problem.
Of course. all of this may be wishful thinkIng Senator MANSFIELD does not pretend to
know how Mr. Khrushchev would react to
such a proposal. If It were put to hlm In
formal fashion, and there Is little In the
record to encourage belle! thl\t the Soviet
Premier would respond favorably. Still, as
the majority leader has stated, uncertainty
as to Mr. Khrushchev's reaction does not relieve us of the obligation to explore any
and all avenues of peace "even as we steel
ourselves for what must come If the way
to peace cannot be found ...
What Is at stake here Is the future of mankind-most certainly Including Americans.
Russians and Germans. Even to, we cannot
yield to unilateral actiOn designed to force
us out of Berlin
If Mr Khrushchev Will
concede nothing, then we and he- --mu t
accept the consequences But such a disa ter should not be called down upon the human race sirnply because nn ob~e~ tvc attachment to old nnd outdated positions pn·cludf's exan"ll!Httlon of ratlonnl nllernnti\'C~
1 From til~

Great Fall Tribune. June 17.
19611
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trusteeship as a free city makes good sense.
That. would be a practical solution to the
renewed threat of a sUicidal East-West arms
conflict over the Berlin trouble spot, now
building up.
MANSFIELD's warning that "we are not engaged In Berlin with the fast draw and TV
wax bullets any more than the Russians are
engaged In a harmless game of chess'' Is In
line with President Kennedy's report on his
exchange of views on Berlin with Khrushchev at Vienna.
As the President put It: "Our most solll;ber
talks were on the subject of G ermany. and
Berlin."
Kennedy reamlrmed the U.S. determination to maintain at any risk Western access
routes to West Berlin and the freedom of
the city's 2 million Inhabitants.
Khrushchev, In t urn, was emphatic In expressing his determination to change the exIsting arrangement at B erlin.
As MANSFIELD sees It, ."sooner or later the
Western nations and the Soviet Union must
seek a new way"-an alternative to war-for
settlement of the Berlin controversy. Few
Informed observers disagree with his further
statement that unless a search for settlement Is pursued with energy and dispatch,
sooner or later. "Berlin Is likely to become
the pivot of a new disaster to mankind."
!From the Providence Evening Journal. June
17, 19611
SENATOR MANSFIELD'S PLAN TO EASE THE
BERLIN CRISIS
As a counter to the Kremlin's demand that
West Berlin be turned Into a free city under
United Nations protection, Senator MIKE
MANSFIELD has revived his proposal that the
free-city status be applied to all Berlin.
This approach to the future of the former
German capital, now split In two by the cold
war and the source of a new crisis threat,
has not excited any more cheers In Bonn
than It did the first time Senator MANSFIELD
advanced It 2 years ago. Indeed, the proposal has been greeted In West Germany with
even more dismay than In 1959 since In the
Interim Mr. MANSFIELD has become Senate
majority leader, exercising greater influence
than before.
From one point of view, the West German
perturbation has some basis In fact . Any
attempt to reunite the East and West sectors
of Berlin, one side a free society supported
economically by the West and the other side
totally communized, poses almost as many
practical problems as the reunification of
Germany Itself.
Indeed, the chances of the Soviet Union's
accepting the Idea are slight since the Kremlin designated East Berlin as the capital of
the Communist East German Government
and would be rei uctan t to remove Ulbricht's
headquarters from the city which still is the
emotional capital of all Germans.
Yet no move could be devised to break the
dangerous deadlock over Berlin that did not
arouse substantial objections. In contrast,
Senator MANSFIELD's proposal has several significant virtues.
Khrushchev, whether intentionally or not,
has turned Berlin into a powder keg by demanding, In the form of successive near-ultimatums, that the Western Big Three retire
!rom West Berlin, which he has characterized
as a "bone In the throat" of the Communist
bloc that must be removed.
He sharpened the ultimatum in his meetIng with President Kennedy In VIenna and
In his fireside chat to the Soviet people. It
will be Increasingly hard for him not to deliver something In the near future. Thus,
Western Insistence on the status quo for
West Berlin helps to keep Khrushchev on his
collision course.
The Mansfield idea, on the other hand,
would end the status quo and take the Big
Three stamp off West Berlin. Yet, It would

wring a matching concession from the SOviet
Union by forcing the ouster of the Ulbricht
government from East Berlin and restoring
the organic unl ty of the cl ty.
Thus, a change of status, satisfying an
acute Soviet need, would be achieved, but
the withdrawal from Berlin would be mutual. One-sided concession by the West, demanded by the Kremlin, which would be a
disastrous and Intolerable defeat for the Atlatlc community and free world, would be
voided. Further, the danger of war over Berlin, now a very real potential, would be
avoided for a few more years, giving the cold
war antagonists time to negotiate their critical differences.
At least, the proposal offers a talking point,
beyond the Soviet demands, and that Is more
than anyone or any nation in the Western
coalition has come up with yet.
The Idea is worth exploring further, even
If it turns out only as a gambit that would
place the Kremlin in the position of dog In
the manger, and take the West off the defensive In the propaga nda war over Berlin and
Germany.
1i''ro n the WJshl.,gton Star. June 15, 19Gli
GOP HE\DS QUERY POLICY ON BERLIN
Republican leaders said yc,.terday t11e
cotPltry is entitled to know whether the proposal of S2nate Dernoc ratic Lender MANSFIELD
to have all of Berlin declared a free city
under international control indicates any
chang~ in the foreign policy of the Kennedy
administration.
Senate Republican Leader DIRKSEN and
House R epublican Leader HALLECK said that
when President Kennedy returned from his
Vienna meeting with SOviet Premier Khrushchev he made positive statements that this
country's position on Berlin had not been
changed and that the United States would
stand by its cxi•ting rights in West Berlin.
But Mr. HALLECK said it is hard to conclude that speeches in the Senate yesterday
by Senator MANSFIELD and other Democrats
were "made out of a clear sky."
Senator DIRKSEN said he got the impres sion the remarks of both Democratic Leader MANSFIELD and his assistant, Senator
HUMPHREY, were trial balloons to get the reaction of the American people.
Advised of their statements, Senator MANSFIELD said he made his suggestion "entirely
on my own" and the administration "had
nothing whatever to do with it."
"I didn't even send copies of it to the
President or the State Department," Senator MANSFIELD told reporters. "It was not
a trial balloon, but a development of suggestions I have b een making for many
months."

fourth part of the city, that which under
wartime agreements was occupied by the
Soviet Union, now bas been turned over to
East Germany. Communist appeals for normalization never Include that portion of the
city In the text. ,
Today's East German resol ution was approved by the Communist Central Committee, the State Council, the Council of Ministers, and the National Front. In all of
these organizations except the National
Front, Walter Ulbricht, former Red army
colonel, is the dominant figure. The resolution said the Bonn Government for years
has evaded all proposals based on peaceful
understanding
It said Bonn now faces a decision of "truly
htstonc importance "
In Bonn, a Government spokesman
shrugged off the East German proposal as
"parrot t,llk."
The spokesma:1 said there is no reason to
believe that the WPstern Powers are retreating before Soviet Premier Khrushchev 's
VIenna demand s.
Government officials also were studying a
proposal by U.S. Senator MANSFIELD, Democrat, of Montana. callmg for the creation
of a free city of Berlin which would Include not only the Western but also the
Eastern sectors of the city.
While criticizing MANSFIELD's contention
that Berlin for the West is an untenable
position, these sources welcomer the possibility of a reestablishment of greater Berlin as a unit.
Officials pointed out that in 1950 West
Germany had proposed free elections for all
of Berlin and the creation of an elective
council perhaps under four-power supervision for the operation of the city as a
whole.
JUDICIARY

BILL

MEETING

LONDON, Thursday, June 15.-Communlst
East Germany has demanded that West Germany ban all rallies in a 3-m!le-wlde zone
along the border between the two Germanys,
especially demonstrations on June 17, anniversary of the 1953 anti-Communist uprising
In East Germany.
(By Bynum Shaw,
Bonn Bureau of the Sun)
BONN, June 14.-Communlst East Germany today Issued an appeal to the United
States, Brita in, France, the Soviet Union,
Poland, and Czechoslovakia for the convocation of a conference to cone! ude a German
peace treaty.
The appeal, aimed at the beginning of
talks on a peace treaty with "both parts of
Germany" a lso called for a "norma!lzatlon
of the situation In w est Berlin."
W est Berlin at present Is occupied by the
United States, Britain, and France. The
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I From the Cincinnati Enquirer. Jun e 16.
19611
RcmEAT?
This week's speech by Senator MIKF. MAN SFIELD, the Democratic floor leader in the
Senate, Is illus trati ve of one of the gravest
weaknesses in the formulation of U .S. foreign
policy since the end of Wo rld War II.
Senator MANSFIELD, who is normally the
admmistration 's spokesman on such rna tters, suggested as a third alternative that
the Berlin crisis be solved by converting the
prewar German capital mto a free city governed by an unnamed internatiOnal au th ority.
The Mansfield proposal is stri kingly llke
Soviet Premier Nikita S. Khrushchev's longtim e advocacy of United Nations control of
Berlin. In view of the di,mal r ecord of the
U.N. as an impartial arbiter in the Congo,
a U.N. mandate m Berlin would be tantamount to a total ntrrender to th e Soviet
Union and its Eas t German snteilite.
Quite apart from its basic unsoundness.
there are two particularly amazing features
in the Mansfield plan for Berlin.
First of all, Senator MANSFI>:LD told the
Senate that he was spcakmg simply as one
PRELUDE TO

!From the Baltimore Sun, June 15, 19611
EAST GERMANY ISSUES CALL FOR PEACE TREATY

GETS

There Is no hope here, however that the
Soviet Union would relinquish an Inch of
territory If the hope of gaining more.
Meanwhile, In Bonn, the Bundestag approved a bill which redefines the status of
the West German judic iary.
The bill would allow 72 judges who served
under the Hitler regime and are known as
"hanging judges," to ask for retirement in
the next year.
If they retire voluntarily, they will retain
full pension rights even If they are not yet
at the pensioning age of 65, If they decline to accept this easy way out, they later
will be removed from office through a change
In the Constitution.
The enforced retirement would deprive
the judges of pension rights.
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lawmaker. But a majority leader never
speaks as a mere lawmaker. Whether he
wants to be or not, he Is armed with the
prestige that his role as an administration
spokesman affords him. Every word he utters, consequently, will be Interpreted
throughout the world as having at least the
foreknowledge of the White House.
Secondly, Senator MANSFIELD could scarcely
have chosen a less opportune time to suggest
that the United States Is thinking of a Berlin
retreat. Too often In the past, we have approached an International crisis apparently
united, apparently conunltted, apparently
determined not to backtrack. And at that
crucial moment, someone steps forward with
an Intimation that the United States might
settle for !ar less than Its official spokesmen
have sought. This procedure Is like advertisIng In advance that we don't mean whnt we
say. Our enemies are encouraged to stand
pat, to enlarge their demands.
The entire U.S. position In Berlin rests
on the occupation agreement concluded between the Big Four at the end of World
War II. We have been Insisting all along
that the Russians fulfill their obligations
under that compact and that they permit
the Western powers to fulfill theirs.
Entering Into' any new agreement would
immediately nulll!y the 1945 agreement. Our
rights In Berlin would be wiped away. So
would the obligations of the Russians.
Nothing, we think, would please Khrushchev more.
The administration should lo..e no time In
repudiating a surrender In Berlin and In
seeking to repair the damage that inevitably
accompanied the Mansfield proposal. Even
with such a disavowal from the White House,
the Western position will be seriously Impaired.
[From the Dallas Morning News, June 16,
1961]
No MERIT IN MANSFIELD PLAN
Senator MIKE MANSFIELD's proposal that all
Berlin be turned over to an International
trusteeship as a free city Immediately raises
a question. Does President Kennedy approve?
Only recently the President said flatly, "We
will fight for Berlin."
Then, at the summit conference, Khrushchev slammed the Issue of West Berlin
down on the table and Lssued an ultimatum
to the Western Powers to get out or the city
within 6 months.
While this now appears to have been the
most Important thing that happened at the
conference, the President did not mention
lt In hls report to the Nation. This creates
speculation as to whether the suggestion of
the Senate Democratic leader Is a move to
open the way for the President to back down
from his bold statement, "We will fight for
Berlin."
Mansfield's proposal ls utterly without
merit. It would merely strengthen Soviet
Russia. The original proposal for admlnlstratlon of Berlin was through a !our-power
agency, Including Russia. But Russia would
never cooperate and has schemed constantly
to put Berlin under Communist control.
This would be Russia's strategy under any
such program as Mansfield now suggests.
Russia desperately wants ·control of West
Berlin because that city Is a constant exhibit
of Western freedom against Soviet slavery.
A large majority of West Berlin citizens have
been constantly loyal to the West. To desert them w,:,uld be a cowardly retreat by the
Western Powers. This woul(l depreciate
their prestige with the nations of the world
more than anything else that baa been done.
The President should immediately voice his
opposition to the Mansfield proposal. The
Senate should turn lt down.

•

[From the Phlladelphla. Evening Bulletin,
June 16, 1961]
THE FUTURE OP BERLIN
Premier Khrushchev has now served
warning, tor the third time, that the problem of Berlin and a divided Germany must
be solved wlthln a fixed period of time.
In 1958 he set the limit at 6 months, but
took no action to implement his threat.
Last year he fixed the new limit as "in 1961."
Now he has repeated this warning, in a
speech to the Russian people reporting on
his VIenna meeting with President Kennedy.
His speech contained little that was new,
and his manner was not bellicose. He simply restated the Russian condlltons for a
settlement--utterly unacceptable to the
West--but he stated them with a firmness
that left little doubt that East and West
this year will see a test of courage and determination centering on Berlin.
His speech confirms President Kennedy's
report that the meeting at Vienna was a
somber one. What ls worse, it gives little
support to th6 one hope that President Kennedy brought home: that as a result of the
meeting the chances for a dangerous misjudgment on either side should now be less.
The President's principal concern at
VIenna was to impress upon Khrushchev
that the West is In deadly earnest In declaring Its Intention of defending its rights
in Berlin, and will take whatever steps are
necessary to meet Its commitments to the
free people in West Berlin.
It Khrushchev was impressed, or his plans
altered, by the Vienna meeting, his address
to the Russian people did not show it. He
seems convinced that the West wlll, when
the chips are down, retreat !rom Its firm
position.
.
II he continues to bold to this view and
acts upon lt, President Kennedy and our
Western allies wll! be compelled to find
means of showing him that be ls stll! misjudging the West; or make an lgnominous
retreat which would be Interpreted throughout the world as meaning that the cold war
is lost.
FLIRTING WITH APPEASEMENT

President Kennedy's difficulties, in showing that the West will not retreat at Berlin,
have been complicated meanwhile by the
fa<::t that Senator MIKE M.v<SFIELD has now
proposed, for the second time, exactly such
a solution for Berlin.
The danger doesn't lie in the scheme Itself, since It's not likely to get far. What's
dangerous is the fact that lt has been put
forth by the Senate majority leader, and
that some of our European allies (and perhaps Russia) are already wondering II It Is
a trial balloon sent up by the admlnlstratlon.
Senator MANSFIELD proposes that East and
West Berlin should be unified in a single
free city, which could better be called a defenseless city. It would be held ln trust by.
an international authority. Both Soviet and
Western garrisons would be withdrawn, and
the city and its access routes would be
guarded by International peace teams.
The bugs In his plan are dragon size.
Khrushchev, for one thing, has repeatedly
declared of late that he wUI insist on a threesided makeup for any major International
control group, wlth a built-in Soviet veto to
paralyze Its work. It tills were agreed to
here, Berlln would be gone In a day.
Senator MANSi'IELD has Ignored some important questions: How long would West
Berlln remain free if its freedom depended
on the determination of International troops
from, say, India, to resist aggression or ,en.croa<::hment by Russia's East Gilrman puppets? Does l:le seriously belleve that the
Soviet Union Is prepared to let East Berllners and East Gilrmans be sUddenly exposed to all the freedoms and prosperity now
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enjoyed by West Berliners? I! he does, he
Is entitled without contest to the Pollyann&
medal of 1961.
Senator MANSFIELD puts forth his plan as
a third way to avoid dangers growing out of
the rlgtd positions taken by Russia and the
West.
His language suggests that both sides are
being stubbornly unreasonable.
The fact ls that the West is standmg on
agreements reached with the Soviet Union
in 1944. The Soviets are threatening to violate them, to gobble up Berlln and one-third
of Germany. The difference Is like that between the rigid positions of an honest citizen and the robber, who, at the point or a
gun, demands his purse.
[From the New York Herald Tribune, June
16, 1961]
SENATOR MANSFIELD'S INVITATION TO

MISCALCULATE
Senator MANSFIELD's proposal for making
a free city of Berlin was prompted, no doubt,
by that irresistible desire to be helpful which
frequently animates Members of Congress
when they happen to ponder great international problems.
Whether from vanity or discretion, he insists that this is his own idea, and not that
of an administration whose majority he
leads in the Senate.
But surely had he stopped to think, Senator MANSFIELD might have considered the
immediate background of events against
which this proposal was paraded, President
Kennedy's meeting with Mr. Khrushchev ln
Vienna disclosed that Berlin Is to be the target of a fresh onslaught by Soviet diplomacy.
The !act that the Senate majority leader
openly suggests a Berlin solution radically
different !rom the position taken by the
West, and hal!way toward Mr. Khrushchev's
own, ls a serious diplomatic blunder.
We may be all too used to Senators speakIng only for themselves, but nobody else I•
Indeed, one of the oldest ruses of diplomacy
Is to characterize as purely personal something which ls later to be unmasked as official. We cannot blame Mr. Khrushchev, or
even Dr. Adenauer, !! they see a trial balloon ln Mr. MANSFIELD's suggestion. Nor
wlll the foolish lmpractlcablllty or Its de ·
talls influence their judgment; trial bolloon'.
after all, are not meant to stay aloft very
long.
[From the New York Times, June 16, 1961]
THE TROUBLES KHRUSHCHEV SELDOM
MENTIONS
(By James ;Reston)
WASHINGTON, June 15.-There ls an odd
distortion In Premier Khrushchev's repon ·
today on his Vienna talks with President
Kennedy.
In discussing what the West might do lr
Moscow made a separate peace treaty w~+'· >
the Communist regime of East Germany, '·"
said: "Some threaten they will not recogn'7"
the treaty and will use force to oppose i
Any force against us will be answered by
force. We have the means."
This ls odd because President Kennedy
personally reassured Mr. Khrushchev on th"
point In Vienna. He drew a sharp dlstlnctln''
between the legal aspects of signing a tree ,
with East Germany and the practical problem o! getting SU!Jplles through to West Berlin.
The President emphasized that the United
States would continue to meet its obliga tions to supply the 2,200,000 people of Wes,
Berlln, by force 1! necessary, but that It was
not particularly concerned about who
stamped the papers at the East Berlin border, just so the supplles went through,
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Nevertheless, In his fireless-side chat tonight, the Soviet leader set up the strawman and threatened to use force under circumstances which the President had told
him would not occur. In fact, when President Kennedy went on to London from
Vienna, the point was repeated that the
Western nations were not going to war over
the color of the stamp on scraps of paper
but that they were determined to get the
supplies through.
Khrushchev, however, is setting the stage
for summoning a big peace conference on
Germany at the October meeting of the
Communist parties. Washington won't like
this and won't participate in such a conference, but nobody here is going to mobilize
the troops to bang through Helmstedt toward
West Berlin just because the Soviet leacter
needs to sign a peace treaty with East Germany for internal Communis t reasons.
Having had previous problems with his
own allies, President Kennedy understands
Mr. Khrushchev's political problems. There
is plenty of trouble in the Communist paradise. Their agricultural policies have been
a spectacular failure. This was supposed
to be Khrushchev's specialty when he came
to power, but it has been his greatest disappointment. In China the food situation is
desperate and may prove by the end of this
year to be the biggest flop and tragedy of
1961.
One result of this is that China is constantly pressing the Soviet Union for more
supplies than Moscow wishes to give and
at the same time challenging Khrushchev's
ideological and political leadership.
All is not well for Khrushchev In other
places either. His dreams of conquest in the
Middle East have not materialized. Nasser
has turned on him and vice versa. Iraq has
not fallen into his lap as the Communist
brethren anticipated. Albania has been defying Moscow and has forced Khrushchev to
dismantle his submarine base in that coun try.
In fact, Khrushchev's whole campaign to
establish a three-headed control of international machinery is a direct result not of
Soviet successes recently but of a spectacular Soviet defeat in the Congo, where the
U.N. forced the Communists out.
It is no wonder Khrushchev wants to prepare the way for at least the impression of
a victory at the big Communist blowout in
October. In Communist terms, his record
is not one of unrelieved success. He is
picking up some easy victories in Laos and
other places close to Soviet borders, but his
difficulties with Peiplng, Carlo, and Albania,
his failure to get the supplies anticipated
from East Germany, the increasing pressure
for more food and freedom in Eastern Europe and even In the Soviet Union itselfali these make his life less serene than it
sometimes appears to be in the West.
Thus, his threats to use force in Germany
sound brave enough but actually mean very
little. If he really wants to show how brave
he Is, a li he has to do is to encourage the
E ast Germans to block the supply routes
to Berlin, and then he will have a test of
courage that will make Stalingrad look like
a tea party.
For this Government is not thinking of
making all of Berlin a free city, no matter
what Senator MIKE MANSFIELD says, and It
is not thinking of war to keep Khrushchev
from signing a peace treaty with East
Germany.
It is merely saying that it will not a bandon the West Berliners; that It will supply
them no matter who stamps the papers, and
It is advising Khrushchev not to let the supplies be stopped unless he wants to risk
everything achieved by the Soviet revolution
in the last 40 years.

1From the New York Daily News, June
16, 1961]
APPEASEMENT AND DEFEATISM

-to come out for a new Berlln setup that
has the mackerel-in-the-moonlight smell of
appeasement and defeatism.
It is the Montana 'Democrat's (and Senate majority leader's) thought that, pending
unification of Germany, all Berlin should be
trusted to some international authority, with
en trances and exits kept open by peace
forces like those which have prevented war
between Israel and Egypt but have not prevented persistent unrest in the former Belgian Congo.
Such a rejiggering in Berlin would o bviously open the whole city to conquest by
Communist mobs, with the Red Army backing them up, unless the peace f or ces were
big enough to beat back the Russian legions.
By agreeing to it, the Western AJlies would
recognize East German y's Communist "government," at least unofficiaJiy, and cause the
captive nations to lose aJI hope of liberation.
Concerning the Ma n sfield proposal. Senator EvERETT M. DIRKSEN, of Illinois, wants to
know whether it is a trial balloon indicat ing that the Kennedy administration now
plans to weasel gradually and slyly out of its
repeated promises to stand firm on West
Berlin.
MANSFIELD says it is not; but, with all due
respect to him, it seems to us that what is
needed in some reassurance from the President himself. Khrushchev, you'Jl remember, said long before the 1960 election that
he expected to be able to deal with a new
U.S. President, whereas he couldn't get to
first base with Eisenhower.
]From the Washington Star, June 16, 1961]
WEST GERMANS PROTES T PLAN OF MANSFIELD

BoNN, GERMANY, June 16.- The West
German Government has come out s trongly
against the Mansfield proposals for a compromise solu tion to the Berlin problem.
Foreign Ministry spokesman, Guenther
von Hase, told a news conference yesterday
the plan would mean deepening the division
of Germany and legalizing to a certain degree Communist East Germany. Mr. Hase
said West Germany would never agree to
this.
U.S. Senator MIKE MANSFIELD had proposed uniting the present Communist and
Western sectors of Berlin and creating a unified free city. I t would be held in trust by
an international organization until Germany
is reunified.
Senator MANSFIELD argued in his speech
before the Senate that this would be one way
to avert the threat of nuclear war that hangs
over the Berlin issue because of the seeming
impossibility of the United States and the
Soviet Union to agree on a solution. He
emphasized that he was speaking for himself, not for the administration.
"We are convinced that the Senator put
forward this plan with the best of intentions, but we regret that we cannot call it
good," Mr. Hase said.
"To foJiow th e plan would mean dividing
Germany into three parts," Mr. Hase said,
meaning West and East Germany, plus the
new free city of Berlin.
The longstanding policy of West Germa ny
is to end the present division of the country through free elections and reestablish
Berlin as the national capital.
"The solution of the Berlin problem cannot be treated separately," Mr. Hase said.
"Berlin ts a part of free G ermany and must
become the capital of a unified Germany."
Then Mr. Hase bore down on the Mansfield proposal that West Germany and East
Germany get together on a new status for
Berlin. Mr. Hase said this would give a form
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of rec.J;;nition and legalization to Communist East Germany, a step West Germany
has firmly opposed. It even refuses to maintain diplomatic relations with countries that
extend them to East Germany.
Praise was given Senator MANSFIELD for
treating Berlin as a whole, in contrast with
Premier Khrushchev. In his memorandum
to President Kennedy Mr. Khrushchev demanded that only the western sector o! the
city be internationalized and demilitarized.
The eastern sector would remain the capital of East G ermany, fully under Communist controL
Mr. H ase said: "The Senator speaks correctly of the whole of Berlin," but that was
a ll he had good to say abou t the Mansfield
pla!1.

1From t!1e W ashington D aily News, June 16,
1961]
MIKE DENIES FLYING BERLIN BALLOON

WASHINGTON, June 15.-Republican Congressional chiefs demanded to know today
whether Senate DemocratiC Leader MIKE
MANSFIELD's proposal that Berlin be made a
free city was a trial balloon for an admin istration policy shift.
MANSFIELD promptly denied that his s u ggestion yesterday in a Senate speech was
designed to test. public reaction. The Montana Democrat said the speech merely was
a compilation of views he and others had
expressed previously. MANSFIELD said he had
not given an advance copy of his remarks
to the White House or the State Department.
Asked about the GOP statement, Associate
White House Press Secretary Andrew Hatcher
declined comment.
MANSFIELD said yesterday that Russia and
the United States must compromise their
differences on Berlin or risk nuclear war. He
proposed a third way-making East an<l West
Berlin a free city. It wo uld r emain under
international trusteeship pending German
reunification.
WONDER

IF

IT'S

A

FEELER

Senate Republican Leader EvERETT M.
DIRKSEN and H ouse GOP chief CHARLES A.
HALLECK questioned Whether MANSFIELD'S
statement was a feeler to determine public
reaction to any new Berlin policy.
HALLECK said the people are entitled to
know "whether there is an official change in
our p osition toward Berlin."
President Kennedy told the Nation after
his Vienna meeting with Khrushchev that
he emphasized to the Soviet Premier this
country's determination to defend its treaty
rights and access to West Berlin.
BONN, June 15.-West Germany never
would sign a proposal, such as Senator
MANSFIELD suggests, to make Berlin a free
city under an international trusteeship, a
Government spokesman said tOday.
Foreign Ministry spokesman Karl Gunther
Von Hase said that MANSFIELD's suggestion
was "incompatible with the inalienable claim
of the German people toward reunification
and freedom."
Von Hase said East Germany's leaders
would have no right to sign such a plan
either, since East Germany "is far from sovereign."
Mansfield's remarks came as something or
a shock In West Germany, where they received banner headlines.
BERLIN, June 15.- East German Communist leader Walter Ulbricht today openly
threatened Interference with West Berlin's
traffic should a German peace treaty be
signed. He hinted that A111ed planes would
be force down !! they tried another Berlin
airlift.
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Speaking In East Btrlln, U.l.>r.,ht advised
the United States, Britain and France to
start Immediate negotiations If they want to
travel to Berlln after a treaty Is signed. He
said road, rall and air traffic would be Interrupted unless the West signed agreements
with East Germany.
GERMAN RAPS "FREE CITY"
The proposal by Senator MIKE MANSFIELD,
Democratic majority leader, to turn Berlln
Into a free city would make the German
metropolis "a city without freedom," Baron
Karl T. Guttenberg, member of the German
Parllament, declared yesterday. He spoke at
Waldorf ceremonies commemorating the
8th anniversary of the East German uprising.
Guttenberg said that replacing the occupying powers-the United States, Great
Britain and France--by any International authority would mean setting up an instrument for Eastern Intervention.
!From the Washington Post, June 17, 19611
RUMORS OF CoNCESSIONS: WEST AGAIN FACES
ISSUE OF ACTION ON BERLIN
(By Chalmers M. Roberts)
Once again the United States and Its
Brl tlsh and French all1es face this question
over Berl)n: should they attempt to stand
pat on the present arrangement; should
they offer to negotiate but only In a Jlmlted
way which could lead to no new agreement
with the Soviet Union; or should they take
the risk of some daring new proposals?
Officially, the United States Is standing
pat. But everyone who went through the
last Berlin crisis, the one precipitated by
Soviet Premier Nlklta S. Khrushchev's ultimatum of Thanksglvmg Day, 1958, assumes
the West wlll go to the conference table
once again to avert a mllltary showdown.
The real question, then, Is whether the
West will again offer some small concessions
or whether It wlll try for a settlement on
the basis of some major new proposals.
Yesterday both the State Department and
the Bntlsh Foreign Office flatly denied a
London Dally Tele~;raph report that Western
experts were working on a plan In which
the West would concede some kind of recognition of Communist East Germany and
the present Oder-Nelsse border between East
Germany and Poland In exchange for a
permanent arrangement for free West
Berlin.
Secretary of State Dean Rusk told newsmen the article was "just not accurate," that
he foresaw no change In the pollcy of standIng firm on Berlin.
Denials to the contrary notwithstanding,
It Is a fact that there has been at least diScussion-some time back, not just since
Khrushchev's demand for a German peace
treaty In 1961-of this very Idea. How far
It has gone Is unknown but It Is a fact that
some very Important persons In the AdminIstration have at least scouted the Idea as
a possibility.
The State Department also took pains to
knock down the Idea that Senate Majority
Leader MIKE MANSFIELD'S Wednesday speech,
calllng for establishment of a free city composed of both East and West Berlln, was an
Administration trial balloon.
MANSFIELD has said he was talking entirely
on his own. In fact he avoided telling r.nyone In the Administration In advance lest
they try to argue him out of making lt. His
point was to get discussion going.
These are not tl>e only people In Washington talking about a bold approach to the
Berlin Issue. Columnist Walter Lippmann
alluded to It on a television Interview Thursday night.
Where It wlll come out Is now totally uncertain since agre-ement will be necessary
not just among the experts but among PresIdent Kennedy, French President Charles de
Gaulle and British Prime Minister Harold

Macmillan. Their current posture Is to
"stand firm."
Today In West Berlin there will be a massive rally, called by Mayor Willy Brandt, to
give the West Berliner's answer to Khrushchev. It will be the eighth anniversary
of the abort! ve 1953 East Berlin and East
German uprising, an uprising crushed by
Soviet mill tary power.
The White House yesterday had no comment on Khrushchev's radio-television
speech of Thursday though the President
received a transcript of the text.
[From the New York Mirror, June 17, 1961]
AaE WE READY?
In the teeth of the Khrushchev ultimatum, the free world must make a choice. Its
nations must stand up and be counted.
There Is no "third way "
For if a third way Is to be entertained,
the way proposed by Senator MANSFIELD, for
Instance, to the disservice of his country, In
our opinion, then there Is to be more compromise and appeasement.
The time for all that Is past.
This may be our last chance.
Khrushchev's ultimatum Is that there
must be a German peace treaty on his terms
by the end of this year, December 31, 1961.
This means a treaty agreement between
East and West with both Germanys or a
unilateral treaty on Communist Russia's
part with Communist East Germany.
It Is not enough to say that must call
Khrushchev's bluii; we must stand firm even
at the risk that he Is not bluJilng.
But Is this a time for utter pessimism?
We believe not. All the cards are not In
Khrushchev's hands, forWe hold some aces on our own side, If
we've got the guts to play out the game-we and our allies.
Our advantage lies In the enemy's weakness; he Is weak In many ways.
1. The Russian people, with whom we
have no quarrel, Insistently are demanding
more of the fruits of peace, more of the
good things of life which ccmmunlsm promIsed and never gave.
2. We are In West Berlin by right and
treaty.
3. The only solution of the so-called German problem Is by free, supervised elections
conducted throughout all Germany. The
world should be reminded continually that
Soviet Russia agreed to elections-and reneged.
4. West Berlin, an enclave within East Germany, has become the world's brightest
showcase of freedom. By thousands each
week, refugees fiee to Its sanctuary from the
Communist surroundings.
5. More Important than all else Is the economic power which we, and to a greater
extent our allles, hold over the Communist
heartland and Its subverted satellites. Are
we and our allies ready to take a declsl ve
step now and cut off all trade with communism and Its bullyragging leader? Therein
lies a positive and powerful reply to Khrushchev.
All trade means all In both directions. It
means not only the strategic goods but the
nonstrategic as well-the "soft" goods, the
luxury Items, the machine tools (how can
they be called nonstrategic), the food, the
loans, the grants, etc. It means we should
buy nothing from Russia or any other Communist land, no oll, no furs or raw materials,
no gourmet's delights such as caviar and
Polish hams, no geegaws !or the Christmas
trees, or felt hats, pocketbooks, leathergoods-anything.
It Is with the bard currencies Russia gains
!rom her trade with the West that she
finances propaganda, subversion, espionage,
riots In which the mobs and students are
paid performers. That money should be cut
off.

Such a program would call for courage, for
patriotism ahead of profit; !or survival ahead
of greed.
Are we ready to stand up? Are our allies
ready?
The chance to answer the questions affirmatively may never come again.
[From the New York Times, June 18, 1961)
WESTERN DIFFERENCES

As to the possibility of negotiating a new
agreement on Berlin, there have been differences In the West. The British have
leaned toward fiexlblllty on negotiating a
new agreement, while the West Germans
have spoken strongly against any compromise.
Talk of a "new approach" to the problem
was heard In the Senate where Majority
Leader MIKE MANSFIELD repeated a proposal
he has made before. It calls !or making all
Berlin a free cl ty to be held In trust by an
International authority, and for garrisoning
the access routes with International peace
terms.
The proposal aroused speculation that Mr.
MANSFIELD was sending up a trial balloon !or
the administration, but he Insisted he was
speaking only for himself. Secretary of
State Dean Rusk, In an effort to counter suspicion that a revision of policy might be In
the making, declared there had been no
change In the U.S. determination to stand
firm on Its rights In West Berlin and to protect the city's people.
Perhaps the strongest comment of the
Khrushchev proposals came from Dirk U.
Stlkker, the new Secretary General of the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization, who
accused the Soviet Premier or deliberately
provoking tension. Dr. Stlkker said: "We
must make up our minds about what we are
ready to do."
Thus It appears the anti-Communist alliance will face a sfern test of nerves and wlll
In the next few months.
1From the New York Times, June 18, 19611
GERMAN UNITY CRY HAs WEAKER SouND-HoPEs FOR A FREE, UNDIVIDED COUNTRY ARE
DIMMED BY THE INCREASED PRESSURE FROM
KHRUSHCHEV
(By Gerd Wilcke)
BoNN, GERMANY, June 17.-Today Is National Unity Day In West Germany and West
Berlin and hundreds of thousands of free
Germans are gathering to commemorate the
uprising 8 years ago of the population of
East Germany against Communist rule.
In essence, the words spoken at today's
rallles are similar to those used last year
and the years before. But the cry for unity
has attained a hollow sound. As one of the
more responsible newspapers of West Germany put It this week:
"We wlll commemorate the day as we did
In the past seven years. But next year's June
17 will not be the same. We can predict
thIs wl thou t resorting to crystal bails. It Is
self-explanatory because Premier Khrushchev has left no doubt that he Is determined to settle the German and Berlin questions before the end of the year."
The editorial and other written and
spoken comment on this "Tag der Elnhelt"
reflect a far greater sense of reall ty than
Germans were willing to subscribe to In the
past. Although used to propagandistic pinpricks from the East there Is, after Premier
Khrushchev's Thursday speech, a greater
conviction among Germans that he means
business.
GERMAN DOUDTS

At the same time there Is an Increasing
lack of conviction that the West means bUSIness to the same degree. As one German
put It: "The Impact of Premier Khrushchev's
radio n.nd tete•1lslon address was great here
not because he said anything new but be-
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cause he said it after seeing the
President."
Although Germans admired the firm way
President Kennedy presented the West's
case in Vienna, they are not entirely convinced that the President will stick it out.
They read with amazement of Senator
MIKE MANSFIELD's suggestion for a compromise in Berlin. Although they cannot be
certain from this distance whether Senator
MANSFIELD refiects the President's views,
they are certain that he represents a current
of thought.
What w!ll happen If the Russians put
through their plan?
In VIenna President Kennedy was extremely forthright In telling Premier Khrushchev what the Western all!es were ready
to do to maintain their access to Berlin.
But the feeling is that the President did not
make clear enough what the West would do
if the Russians sign a separate peace treaty
with Communist East Germany.
This, it is felt, provided Premier Khrushchev with au Important opening that
could allow him to sign a treaty without
fear that the West would offer any vigorous
military response.
Now the prospect is that Premier Khrushchev will call a conference before the year
Is out to proceed with a treaty for East
Germany, The West, as has been indicated,
w!ll Ignore the conference.
Once the treaty Is signed, Germans feel,
a period of quiet may follow to settle nerves
and allow the West to get accustomed to the
Idea before the squeeze is put on. The
squeeze could take several forms.
First the East Germans could demand the
right to stamp the papers of the Western
allies using the access routes to Berlin.
PERSONNEL CHECKS
Even If the West took the view that It
would not be worthwhile to go to war over
rubber stamps or even if the late John
Foster Dulles' theory was followed-that the
East Germans were merely acting as agents
of the Soviet Union-the question of East
Germans checking on allied personnel would
be a ticklish one.
Then, as East Germany's Communist
Chief Walter Ulbricht discussed in his news
conference this week, there is the question
of air safety over Berlin.
'I)le Russians could someday withdraw
thetr representative from the all!ed air control center and send an East German Instead. The West would have to take a
stand immediately. Aside from the military
needs, It would have to consider the safety
of the 100-odd commercial planes that touch
on Berlin every day.
Then there are the more than 2 million
Berliners who have remained free because
they had the protection of the allies. A
cutoff from West Germany would bring back
old hardships even it a new airlift-if that
Is still feasible-would keep open a lifeline.
AI though present supplies of vital foodstuffs, coal, building materials, gasoline and
so forth are so huge that West Berliners
could get by for up to a year, immediate
problems would arise In other fields.
Because the city is not self-sufficient Bonn
pumps about 1,500 million deutsche marks
( $375 million) into Berlin each year. Bonn
also buys more than 60 percent of the city's
manufactured products.
If the money were cut off, the city's budget would be unbalanced and it would have
no funds to extend business credits, pay oldage penstons or restitutions to Nazi victims.
An Isolation of Berlin also would shut
the gateway of the thousands of East Germans who seek refuge in the West every
~onth, He~r Ulbricht calls the refugee camps
spy nests of the Western allies. For those
who go there the reception centers are the
last ray of hope that there st!ll is freedom
and human dignity.
No.l03--6

The rqueeze on Berlin, ·which for the Soviet camp would be a step-by-step fight to
gain recognition for East Germany, could
go on Indefinitely but surely a point would
come where the West would have to decide
how much It wants to take.
One cannot judge from here where this
point Is as It involves the great unknown of
the West's contigency planning going on in
Western capitals.
But this much is clear. Premier Khrushchev's apparent conviction that he can get
away with a separate peace treaty and Its
consequences for Berlin despite allied warnings has made a deep Impression on Germans and has disturbed them.
Although the West has said no to Premier
Khrushchev's formula, people here feel that
a negative response alone Is no policy. What
is more, they fear that any compromiEe on
Berlin is the first step out of Berlin.
What weapons can West Germans use to
fight a compromise? The biggest, it seems,
is the weapon of discouragement.
After the United States, West Germany
makes the largest manpower contribution
to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.
If the Germans were to lose faith in the
West, the concept of Western defense would
go by the board. I t also would bring up
the danger that a future West German Government might look for Its own accommodations with the Russians. It would not be
the first time in history.
All this refiects a great turning point in
the Germans' thinking. They feel Premier
Khrushchev is determined to have things
his way. But they ask themselves: "How
determined is the West?"
[From the Wall Street Journal, June 16,
1961]
THE BONE IN KHRUSHCHEV'S THROAT

Berlin, the bone Khrushchev says must
come out of the Soviet throat, is u sually
regarded as the one object above all that the
United States will not release. Yet a good
many Americans have long felt that, because
our position there is so awkward and potentially dangerous, some new arrangement
needs to be worked out with the Soviets.
The position is awkward and potentially
dangerous, as it must be in an enclave 110
miles east of the Iron Curtain. A new arrangement is needed-the kind that would
reratify Western rights in West Berlin and
make the Soviets and their East German
stooges respect them once and for all.
That, however, is not what is usually
meant by a new arrangement; Increasingly
the talk Is of a compromise between the Soviet and the United States positions. One
of the most thoughtful of such plans in
Senator MANSFIELD's for a "third way" out
of the Berlin problem which Khrushchev
posed once more in his speech yesterday.
Khrushchev proposes that West Berlin be
made a free city, detached from West Germany, with East Berlin an integral part of
East Germany; in this way he hopes to gain,
gradually if not at once, all Berlin. MANsFIELD proposes that the whole city be united
as a free city held in trust by an international authority, presumably the U.N. Its
status would be guaranteed by NATO and the
Communist Warsaw Pact satellites; Its access
routes would be garrisoned by international
peace teams.
Like all "third ways" we have so far heard
ot, this falls short of the requirements of
U.S. security. U .N. troops are too easily used
!or the political purposes of their national
masters, as has been notoriously the case in
the Congo; they are not safe substitutes for
United States, British, and French soldiers
in Berlin. Indeed, if Khrushchev were to
accept such a proposal, It would be cause for
real alarm, for it would mean he saw his
dream of grabbing all Berlin coming true.

tmposstble to negotiate a safe new arrangement wtth the Soviets along these lines. we
are in Berlin by our rights of conquest; we
remain by power. But does this make it an
in tolerable situation?
Let us remember that Berlin is in truth
a bone gagging Khrushchev's throat; to that
extent, his discomfort should be a comfort
to us. West Berlin is the gateway to freedom for millions from the East. It is living
proof, day in and day out, of the lie of the
Communist promise. No wonder Khrushchev can't stand it. But we can.
Khrushchev is expected to make more
tro:>ble in Berlin later in the year-interfermg with traffic and a lot of other things.
Certamly the harassments and complicatiOns he can cause are almost limitless, as we
know from the Berlin blockade and Jesser
annoyances since then. This prospect has
led some to fear that he may be able to
mbble. us out of Berlin, somewhat as he is
domg m Laos.
It could happen-but only if we let it
happen. Berlin is not Laos. Rightly or
wrongly, we let Laos go because everything
including the apathy of the people, seemed
against us; and we could let it go without
abandoning all Asia. In Europe, the dividing line was long since clearly drawn, and
Berlm Is the outpost. Our determination
to defend Berlin represents nothing more nor
less than our determination to defend Western Europe and America.
With that resolve, we can meet Khrushchev's provocations, whatever they may be.
And if he should throw at us the ultimate
provocation of war, then we must face that
in the reallza tion only surrender could have
averted it. The worst thing that could happen to America is not war but the despairing
notion that nothing is worth fighting for.
The firmer we are, the less chance of war.
Fundamentally, Berlin is Khrushchev's
problem, not ours. Let him push and prod,
nibble and seek to negotiate us out; we need
only stand fast. It is not up to us to offer
new arrangements to accommodate his greed·
it Ls up to him to begin acting civilized.
'
If he ever should, then It might be possible to make a safe and more peaceful settle ment_ of th~ status of Berlin. But if he persists m belltgerence, our first duty is to make
clear there is no third way out of our commitment to freedom.

